Our difference-in-differences approach relies on the assumption that our parallel ballot initiatives are sufficiently similar, and that the electoral contexts for both elections are sufficiently similar.
Proposition 153, Higher Education Facilities Bond Act (1992) "This act authorizes a bond issue of nine hundred million dollars ($900,000,000) to fund the construction or improvement of California's public college and university facilities. Authorized projects for the 138 public campuses shall include, but are not necessarily limited to, earthquake and other health safety improvements, modernization of laboratories to keep up with scientific advances, and construction of classrooms and libraries."
The text of the initiative indicates that the Governor and legislature will decide how to spend the bond money, with the intention of constructing new buildings and altering existing buildings in the University of California, California State University, and community college systems, with no money allowed to be spent on building new campuses. Prop 153 was supported by the chairman of the State Senate Education Committee, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, and the president of the University of California.
It was opposed by members of the Libertarian Party and several University of California faculty members.
A.2 Key Races in the 1990 and 1992 Primary Elections
If we consider the entire county of Los Angeles, the 1992 primary election had more competitive and highprofile elections compared to the 1990 primary election. However, in the areas most proximate to the riots there were locally competitive elections in both cycles. Los Angeles County were Xavier Becerra's CA-30 with a winning margin of less than 5,000 votes, in Watts and Compton where Walter Tucker won by less than 1,000 votes, and Ed Royce's 39th district, bordering Orange County, with a margin of 3,500 votes. There was a competitive State senate race in the 23rd (Beverly Hills), and competitive Assembly races in the 38th (Northridge), the 44th (Pasadena), 46th (East LA), 49th (Watts), 50th (Huntington Park), and 57th (East San Gabriel Valley) districts.
A.3 Competitiveness Analysis
For the purposes of testing the consequences of competitiveness on our analysis, competitive races are defined as open races, i.e., those in which no incumbent ran. In 1992, the Los Angeles basin had open races for Senate Districts 19, 23, and 25, Assembly Districts 46 through 58, and Congressional Districts 25, 30, 33, 36, and 37. In 1990 , there were open seats in Assembly Districts 48, 52, 58, and 59, and Congressional District 29.
If higher turnout in precincts with competitive races is correlated with political preferences, this could represents a threat to the validity of our difference-in-differences estimates. To assess this threat, we divide our data into precincts with no competitive races in the primary elections of either 1990 or 1992, and precincts with one or more competitive races in one of those two elections.
We define a competitive precinct as any precinct with an open race in either 1990 or 1992 for Congress, State Assembly, or State Senate. A noncompetitive district is one with no open seats in either year for any of those three seats. If we find that the distribution of the difference-in-differences is substantively similar between both subsets, then we can infer that differential turnout in competitive races is not driving our result. replicates this analysis for 752 noncompetitive precincts. We are unable to identify the districts in which the remaining 85 precincts fall.
We observe very similar population averages of the difference-in-differences estimates across these two subsets. Among precincts with competitive races, the population-weighted mean of the overall difference-indifferences is 0.047, while the weighted means among white voters and African American voters are 0.029 and 0.071, respectively. For comparison, the weighted means among precincts without competitive races are 0.055 for all voters, 0.028 for African American voters, and 0.076 for white voters. We therefore conclude that our results are not driven by differentially competitive races in 1992 as compared to 1990. The dashed lines represent the weighted mean of each distribution. The distribution of difference-in-difference estimates among noncompetitive precincts look substantively very similar to the distribution of difference-in-difference estimates among all precincts.
Difference in Differences: All Voters

B Ecological Inference: Assumptions and Robustness
King's Ecological Inference (EI) (King, 1997a ) method incorporates two key components: the method of bounds of Duncan and Davis 1953 , and a random coefficient model with parameter variation characterized by a truncated normal distribution (Swamy, 2012) . The first component limits the possible range of EI parameters, while the second structures the correlations between them.
The method makes three key assumptions: (1) parameter variation is characterized by a truncated bivariate normal distribution; (2) that the parameters are uncorrelated with the regressors; and (3) there is no spatial autocorrelation.
In a thorough analysis of EI's sensitivity to its assumptions, (Cho, 1998) shows that even in the presence of spatial autocorrelation, EI performs exceedingly well. This is comforting, since our analysis explicitly finds spatial autocorrelation of far smaller magnitude of that tested by Cho. She performs a similar analysis with the truncated bivariate normal distribution, and finds similarly reassuring results.
However, she notes that the most severe errors occur when the data are in violation of the second assumption, often called the "no aggregation bias assumption." In the case of the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the no aggregation bias assumption substantively implies that the African-American (white) population in a strongly African American (white) district supports public schools at the same or a similar rate to the African-American (white) population in a strongly white (African American) district.
For African American voters, we believe this is a relatively safe assumption. The African-American population in the Los Angeles basin in 1992 was extremely homogeneous in its preferences, registering as Democrats more than 95% of the time. Moreover, in our survey data, we find little heterogeneity in political preferences by location.
However, we are less confident in the no aggregation bias assumption for white voters: due to residential sorting or effects of segregation on voting (Enos, 2017) , it is possible that whites in heterogeneous precincts are more liberal than whites in more homogeneously white precincts. Therefore we attempt to infer, should this bias exist, the extent to which it could affect our results.
If such aggregation bias is present, the results of EI will underestimate the liberalness of whites in heavily African-American or Latino precincts, and overestimate the liberalness of whites in homogeneously white precincts. In the aggregate these effects should cancel out, and therefore should not bias our unweighted difference-in-difference estimates. However, when we apply weights to each precinct inversely proportional to the size of the ecological inference standard error, as suggested by King (1997b) ; Adolph et al. (2003) , we effectively down-weight whites in heterogeneous precincts and up-weight whites in homogeneous precincts.
In practice this up-weights precincts for which our results indicate that whites are surprisingly liberal, and down-weights precincts for which our results indicate the opposite, thereby potentially generating bias in favor of our results. Thus we report both weighted and unweighted estimates for the group-specific difference-indifferences. We note that these estimates are nearly identical, regardless of weighting. The weighted average value of the difference-in-differences estimate for whites is 0.029, and for African Americans, it is 0.071. The unweighted value for whites and for African Americans are 0.028 and 0.076, respectively.
With a prior that the key EI assumption is not violated for African-Americans and not finding evidence that it biases our results for whites or African Americans we are confident in our use of ecological inference for studying political preferences of racial subgroups in the Los Angeles basin in 1992.
C Robustness and Placebo Tests C.1 Raw Support for Ballot Initiatives by Race
We visualize the two components of our difference-in-differences to explore their underlying individual trends.
The plots in figure C.1 display the precinct-level change in support for each referendum (bottom two panels), and the difference-in-differences (top panel), on the vertical axes. The horizontal axes show the proportion of the precinct population that is white (left column) or African American (right column). The overall trend in this figure suggests that the more African American a precinct is, the greater the increase in support for public schools following the riot.
C.2 Geographic Distribution of Difference-in-Differences Values
Here we present maps indicating the difference-in-differences estimates for each precinct, first for all voters, and then for white voters only. Note that among both white voters and all voters, larger values of the difference-in-differences estimates are within the area most affected by the riot, indicated by the black ellipse. The black ellipse indicates the riot area from a one standard deviation ellipse (Wang, Shi and Miao, 2015) around the locations of all deaths attributed the riot.
C.3 Distance Analysis Robustness Tests
We conduct several tests of spatial dependence and find that changes in political behavior are correlated with distance from the geographic origin of the riot and not from other locations in Los Angeles, such as other African American population centers. estimates (Adolph et al., 2003) . Table C .1 shows that the post-riot change in policy support is correlated with distance from the riot through regression analysis. We estimate weighted least squares regression coefficients with weights based on population when considering all voters; when considering racial subgroups weights are based on the standard errors of the EI estimates. We include both linear and quadratic terms on distance to account for potentially nonlinear effects. Considering all voters combined (Columns 1 and 2), distance is linearly negatively correlated with EdDiff, meaning that moving further away from the riot, voters are less supportive of public schools. Results from the same regression specifications limited to white voters 
C.4 Distance Coefficients for Heavily Black Precincts Inside and Outside Riot Area
Among the top quartile of predominantly African-American precincts, we perform a series of placebo regressions where each precinct's centroid is treated as a placebo riot epicenter. We calculate the distance from all other precincts to that placebo precinct's centroid, then regress EdDiff on Distance placebo . The coefficients on Distance placebo are displayed in Figure 3 of the manuscript. Figure C .5 presents the coefficients on Distance placebo , separated by whether the placebo precinct falls inside and outside the riot zone as defined by a one standard deviation spatial ellipse around riot deaths. We note that the coefficients are markedly Figure C .4: Loess lines for the value of the precinct-level difference-in-differences among African American voters (top) and white voters (bottom). Each point is weighted by the inverse of the standard error associated with its EI-derived difference-in-differences estimate, as suggested by Adolph et al. (2003) .
Points are sized, and the loess line weighted, by the inverse standard error of the EI estimates for each precinct. higher among precincts within the riot zone and that a t test for difference of means of these distributions yields t = 10.70.
C.5 Parallel Ballot Initiatives in 1986 and 1990 Placebo Test
As an additional robustness check, we examine two pairs of parallel ballot initiatives in which both votes occur prior to the riots. In both the 1986 and 1990 general elections in California, there were ballot initiatives proposing bonds for public schools and higher education. We expect, in absence of a politicizing event as salient and powerful as the 1992 Los Angeles riots, that we will not find effects of the same strength as those between 1990 and 1992.
We construct the same difference-in-differences estimator as before, using different ballot initiatives:
These ballot initiatives and the associated elections have several features that make them different from the initiatives used to construct EdDiff from 1990 to 1992 and, perhaps, an unreliable comparison: the population is different because the elections are general elections, rather than primaries; the elections occur four years apart, rather than two; and data on the racial composition of the electorate is not as reliable because of the time span between the 1986 election and 1990 census.
We expect that since there is no event prior and proximate to the 1990 general election to affect the salience of distance from that particular location, a regression of distance from Florence and Normandie on
EdDiffPlacebo will be smaller than the coefficients on distance from the true test.
As shown in Table C .3, the relationship between EdDiffPlacebo and distance from the future location of the riot is smaller what we observed in Table C .1, suggesting that, in the absence of the riots, the relationship between voting and distance from Florence and Normandie would have been more muted. In the first two columns of Table D .3 we show results from regressions of support for spending on "improving our nation's education system" on an indicator for whether the respondent was asked either before or after the Rodney King trial verdict. Both excluding (Column 1) and including demographic controls (Column 2), the estimated coefficient on the "after verdict" indicator is approximately zero. In
D Survey Data Analysis
Columns 3 and 4, we repeat this analysis with self-reported respondent ideology as the dependent variable.
We observe no evidence that African American respondents' ideology changed following the verdict. is support for education spending, as measured by the degree to which respondents agree that too little is spent to improve education (respondents indicated whether we are "spending too much", "spending the right amount" or "spending too little" on "improving the nation's educational system"). 
E Distribution of Voters Registering Before and After the Riot E.1 Alternative Dates Before and After Deadline
Here we replicate the results from Table 3 using different date specifications to ensure that our findings are not dependent on the particular window of time examined in the main analysis. In particular, we compare dates on either side of the riot that are comparable in terms of distance from the registration deadline. 
E.2 Voter Registration Over Time
We use later years to compare the surge in registration in 1992 to the surge before other elections. Using 
F Voter File Matching and Attrition
In matching the 1992 and 2005 California voter files, we cannot identify voters who left the state between those years. We also lose voters who change their name due to marriage. Other voters die, or move and then do not re-register, and are subsequently removed from the voter file due to inactivity.
Here we detail calculations used to estimate the percentage of the 1992 voter file we expect to be able to identify in 2005. In all cases, we aim to produce conservative estimates which will underestimate the number of people we expect to have attritted. Overall, we expect more than 9,600 individuals from our 1992 sample of 30,166 to have attritted (see below). In step 1, we match exactly on first name, last name, and date of birth. In this stage, we locate 19,165 individuals. In the second stage, we merge the remainder on first name, middle name, and date of birth among women only. Here, we locate an additional 1,920 individuals, bringing our merged total to 15,244. While we estimate that about 3,314 women in our original sample will have changed their names due to marriage, we are only able to locate 1,920.
We attempted several different alternate merge schemes, including matching last names from 1992 to "previous last name" from the 2005 file along with first name and date of birth, but this produced no matches. Additionally, we tried a fuzzy merge where we merged within a set Levenshtein distance from a merge identifier consisting of first name, last name, date of birth, and imputed race, but this produced an excess of false-positive matches.
In order to assess the performance of our matching exercise, we estimate the total amount of expected attrition from the voter file due to (1) name changes at marriage, (2) death, and (3) migration.
Marriage We use Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data on marriage rates by age among women as of year 2000 (Aughinbaugh, Robles and Sun, 2013) . Since marriage rates have been decreasing over time, we believe this should produce an underestimate of the true number of married women who have changed their names.
Using date of birth from the voter file, we calculate the age of everyone in the sample in year 1992. The BLS provides marriage probabilities binned by age: 25% of women under the age of 25 are married; 53% between 26 and 35; 81% between 36 and 45; and 86% of women aged 46 and over. Using this formula, we calculate the number of women married in 1992, and the number of the unmarried women who would become married by 2005, and subtract those numbers. Finally, we multiply this difference by 0.85, corresponding to the 15% of women who do not change their name at all after marriage. This totals to 2,457 women whom we estimate changed their last names. While in theory we may be able to find these women in the second stage of our merge, in practice our voter file often excludes middle name, resulting in failed merges for this stage.
Death According to the Center for Disease Control, the yearly mortality rate for African Americans is 733 per 100,000; for white and Hispanic people, it is 350 per 100,000 (CDC, 2016) . Using our imputed race values, and accounting for yearly compound reductions in population, we estimate a sample attrition of 824 people.
Migration Out-migration from California has averaged 500,000 per year since 1990 (Perry et al., 2016) .
Out-migration has disproportionately occurred from urban areas; we assume that this out-migration has happened equally across the state, which should produce an underestimate of our sample decay.
California contained approximately 31 million people in 1990. We multiply our 1992 sample size of 30, 166 individuals who registered in the ten weekdays before and after the riot by (500, 000/31, 000, 000), times the number of years between 1992 and 2005, for a total of 6, 325 individuals from our sample who we expect to have left California, and thus to no longer appear on the voter rolls (30, 166 * (500, 000/31, 000, 000) * 13 = 6, 325).
Total Summing these components, we estimate attrition of 9,606 individuals between 1992 and 2005, of whom 2,457 are potentially identifiable using voter file variables which involve previous registration names.
Aside from this, there are additional reasons why people may be invalidated from voting, including felony convictions, incarceration, and mental illness. Finally, while more than 7,000 voters became ineligible to vote due to death or out-migration, it is an open question as to how many changed their address and failed to re-register, or were purged from voter rolls due to inactivity. 
G Long-term Participation of Riot Registrants
In Tables G.1 and G.2 we regress participation in the 2004 primary and general elections, respectively, on registration before or after the riot.
H Race Imputation Methodology
Here we further assess the validity of our imputations. Our imputation procedure has three steps. In the first step we match the census surname race probability file to the voter file; 89% of individuals have an exact match. For the remaining 11% , we perform a fuzzy match to identify the closest surname; this reduces error from typos in the voter file and multiple forms of the same surname. After this step, 38 individuals remain with no surname match within our threshold of string distance. The second step involves geolocating each registered voter's address and then locating that address within a census block, then merging that census block ID to a file of race by census block. Due to geolocating errors, roughly 130,000 individuals were placed in census blocks with zero population. None of the 38 individuals with no surname information were also placed in a zero population census block. The final step involves a Bayesian update in which we take the census information as a prior and then update it using the surname probabilities, producing a posterior of racial probabilities.
Our imputed value is the race with the highest probability, even if it is not a majority. To determine how sensitive our results are to these imputations, we perform an analysis in which for each individual we draw from their race distribution, rather than merely taking the modal value, and reproduce our results in Tables 2 and 3. For 1,000 iterations, we resample the race of everyone in our data set and reproduce Tables 2 and 3 in the main text. Then we take a 95% confidence interval of each value in those tables. We might be concerned that our imputation bias is much higher among African Americans than among whites. To allay these concerns, we show the imputation posterior probability of being white among all registrants we identify as white and compare those to the posterior probability of being African American among all registrants we identify as such, to show that there are minimal differences. In Figure H .1 we break down these distributions by all registrants, only pre-riot registrants, and only post-riot registrants. is what proportion of these votes can be attributed to mobilization (i.e., new voters entering the electorate after the riot) versus persuasion (i.e., voters changing their minds on public education bonds in the wake of the riot). Since we cannot directly observe individual votes cast for or against these ballot initiatives, we conduct a "back of the envelope" calculation to assess the importance of mobilization vis-à-vis persuasion.
We find that 24,587 individuals registered to vote between the end of the riot and the 1992 primary election registration deadline. Note that if all of these individuals voted in support of public schools in 1992, this would entirely account for the increase in support for public education in the basin following the riot. For reasons discussed in the main text, we anticipate that a high proportion of those new registrants subsequently turned out the vote in the primary, and voted in support of bonds for public schools. If 80% of those new registrants turned out to vote, and support for public schools was equivalent to the percent of new registrants who registered as Democrats (62%), mobilization of new registrants would account for just over half of the "unexplained" votes in favor of public education funding. If we include those who registered with a third party or as unaffiliated, along with Democrats, mobilization of new registrants would account for 69%
of those "unexplained" votes. These highly-conservative estimates assume that zero percent of individuals who were registered prior to the riot were mobilized and voted "yes" in 1992 after having voted "no" or abstained in 1990. Thus we are confident in asserting that mobilization, rather than persuasion, was the driving force in the post-riot increase in voter support for public education.
I.2 Precinct-level Mobilization and Support for Public Education
Figures I.1 and I.2 provide further evidence that a large portion of the shift in policy support is attributable mobilization rather than persuasion. We subset the voter file to individuals who registered in the wake of the riot (but before the extended registration deadline) and aggregate up to the precinct level. Each point in the scatterplots thus represents a precinct, with the size of the dot scaled to the number of registrants in that precinct. In figure I .1, along the horizontal axis we show the proportion of registrants who affiliated with the Democratic party, and along the vertical axis we show the difference-in-differences value for that precinct. 
